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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines the relationship between insider trading and market liquidity (spread and 
depth) of NASDAQ-100 stocks.  Tests on an intraday sample of sell trades show no evidence of 
cross-sectional association between the width of the spread and insider trading, but detect some 
widening of the spread after the fact.  Overall, our results provide mixed evidence on the ability of 
NASDAQ dealers to unravel informed order flow and adjust spreads accordingly.  Their short-
term behavior suggests an inability to detect insider trading and widen spreads, but their behavior 
over time suggests that dealers may attempt to recover what they apparently lose at a given point 
and time.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
he interest in market microstructure is a growing phenomenon. In fact, Campbell, Lo, and MacKindlay 
(1997, pp. 83-84) state, “Indeed, market microstructure is now one of the most active research areas in 
economics and finance, spanning many markets and many models.” Numerous market microstructure 
studies show that market arrangements affect market liquidity and asset returns. One important issue in market design 
involves the issue of whether trader anonymity – the extent to which a trader is recognized as informed or not – affects 
market liquidity as measured by bid/ask spreads.
1 
 
Although some trading models based on asymmetric information assume that markets are anonymous or that 
trader identity is unobservable, others do not.
2   
The assumption of anonymity may apply in some electronic systems, 
but it does not characterize other trading venues such as the NYSE specialist system. In fact, some exchange members 
claim that the professional relationships that evolve on exchange floors yield benefits that an anonymous exchange 
mechanism cannot easily duplicate. Thus, information-based models suggest that the impact of information on spread 
may differ between trading venues because of differences in the severity of information asymmetries. 
 
Benveniste, Marcus, and Wilhelm (1992) argue that market makers in open-outcry environments such as the 
NYSE will likely react differently to insider trading than screen-based dealers such as NASDAQ. They contend that 
the unique relationship between specialists and floor brokers on the NYSE leads to less anonymity because specialists 
can learn information about traders’ motives from floor brokers. Consequently, the behavior of specialists will differ 
depending on whether they perceive the trades as informed or uninformed. For example, the degree to which 
specialists are exposed to informed trading may affect the bid/ask spread. If specialists lose money when trading with 
individuals who possess superior information (informed traders such as insiders), they are likely to widen the spread 
to recover potential trading losses. Thus, a positive association should exist between the spread and the severity of 
information asymmetries confronted by specialists.  
 
Benveniste, Marcus, and Wilhelm (1992) show that the benefits of a floor exchange mechanism are greatest 
when the potential for privately informed trading is greatest and when liquidity traders are most sensitive to 
T 
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transaction costs. This suggests that floor exchange mechanisms should yield their greatest benefits in markets for 
assets such as stocks and options where the potential for private information is greatest. They argue, however, that 
NASDAQ dealers will not behave differently based on informed and uninformed trades because they are unlikely to 
have information about trader type.   
 
Prior studies examine the impact of information asymmetry on spread changes around important 
announcements such as stock repurchase, acquisition, dividends, earnings and insider holdings (see, for example, 
Conrad and Niden (1992), Lee, Muckrow, and Ready (1993), Foster and Viswanathan (1995), and Kini and Mian 
(1995)). A problem with these information events studies is that they use indirect and not completely satisfactory 
measures of the extent of information asymmetry. Several studies also present evidence that insiders reap positive 
abnormal returns (or avoid abnormal negative returns) when they trade their company shares because they presumably 
have access to private information and they act upon that information (see, for example, Lamba and Khan (1999) and 
Seyhun (1986)).
3 
 
Chung and Charoenwong (1998) use a direct measure of information asymmetry to investigate the effect of 
insider trades on spreads quoted by specialists in NYSE and AMEX listed stocks. The theory of information 
asymmetry predicts that specialists should widen their spreads when corporate insiders trade presumably because 
insiders trade on private information, i.e., they have superior knowledge compared with the specialists. Using 
information on insider trading during 1988, Chung and Charoenwong find a significant cross-sectional association 
between spread and insider trading, but no significant time series effects. 
 
Garfinkel and Nimalendran (2003) focus on tests of relative anonymity by comparing specialist and dealer 
reactions to insider trading. Using a matched firms approach, they find that specialists are better able to discriminate 
between an informed and uninformed order flow compared to market makers on NASDAQ. Specifically, their results 
show that when corporate insiders trade medium-sized quantities (500-9,999 shares inclusive), NYSE listed stocks 
exhibit larger changes in proportional effective spreads than NASDAQ stocks. Their results support the hypothesis by 
Benveniste, Marcus, and Wilhelm (1992) that the unique relationship between specialists and floor brokers on the 
NYSE leads to less anonymity than on NASDAQ. 
 
The purpose of our study is to examine the impact of insider trading on liquidity (spread and depth) in 
NASDAQ stocks. We assume that insiders are better informed than outsiders and that the motivations for their trades 
reflect private information.
4
 We test whether NASDAQ dealers can detect informed (insider) trading. If they can, we 
expect them to behave actively and alter their behavior on insider trades by widening of quoted spreads. Specifically, 
we examine the relation between quoted spreads and insider selling activity in NASDAQ-100 stocks during the period 
July through September 1998, a typical length for market microstructure studies    We also examine changes in quoted 
depth from NASDAQ dealers in response to insider trading. 
 
Our paper builds on the Chung and Charoenwong (1998) approach but examines the effect of insider trading 
on spreads quoted by dealers on NASDAQ, not by specialists in NYSE and AMEX listed stocks.  For comparison 
purposes, we use a similar cross-sectional regression model as Chung and Charoenwong.
5  
Thus, our study of the 
impact of insider trading on market liquidity in NASDAQ complements that of Chung and Charoenwong involving 
similar effects on the NYSE and AMEX. Unlike Garfinkel and Nimalendran (2003), we do not test for differences in 
the reaction to insider trading across alternative market structures. That is, our concern is not whether a positive 
difference exists between specialist and dealer responses to insider trading. Because of different purposes and 
methodologies, the empirical results of these two studies are not directly comparable.  
 
Our study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, few empirical studies focus on the quote 
response to information conveyed by insider trading.  Our study fills a gap not covered by Chung and Charoenwong 
(1998) in that we examine a different market structure. Thus, we add to the limited evidence about how different 
market structures respond to informed trading. Second, we examine both spread and depth because together they give 
a better picture of market liquidity than spread alone. 
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The remainder of the paper has the following organization.  In the next section, we discuss the market 
microstructure differences between consolidated and the fragmented markets. We then explain our data, variables, and 
methodology followed by a presentation of our empirical results. In the final section, we present our conclusions. 
 
MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE DIFFERENCES AND INFORMATION FLOW 
 
The NYSE offers an open outcry auction trading environment that funnels order flow to one central place 
(the floor) where all the buy and sell orders are consolidated around the post of a single specialist. As agents for 
customers, brokers try to get the lowest possible price for the buy orders and the highest possible price for the sell 
orders. Price discovery occurs through the interaction of supply and demand of public order flow. The specialist in an 
assigned stock maintains a two-sided continuous market by offering bid and ask quotes and respective sizes (the 
number of shares of a stock the specialist is willing to buy at bid and sell at offer). The specialist continually adjusts 
quotes based on supply and demand trading sentiments in assigned stocks.  Consolidated markets are informationally 
transparent because all activity takes place at one central location. This transparency makes specialists less vulnerable 
and better positioned to adjust the spread due to the arrival of informed order flow compared with market makers in 
markets with less anonymity.  
 
Participants in an open outcry view all pit trading activity. Because market bids and offers are announced 
publicly, traders know who is making bids and offers. They know whether one or more traders are trying to hit the bid 
price or take the market offer.  They also know whether a broker is filling a single customer order or many orders of 
small customers. Finally, they know whether outside orders or other traders, who are trying to balance their positions, 
are driving the market. Floor traders contend that pit information, floor intelligence, noise level, and eye contact 
provide them with valuable information about the arrival of incoming orders, market trends, and motives of other 
traders. Supposedly, this information flow helps them unveil superior information trading and adjust the spreads 
accordingly.  
 
By contrast, NASDAQ offers relatively anonymous, screen-based trading in which geographically dispersed 
multiple dealers make markets in chosen stocks. Unlike floor trading, the entire order flow in a given stock is not 
consolidated at one central location but is fragmented across multiple dealers from many different locations. 
Fragmentation of order flow and information occurs on NASDAQ because of multiple dealers. Moreover, dispersed, 
computerized NASDAQ traders do not have exposure to the same information about the feel of the market or the 
motivations of potential counterparties that is available to traders who are face-to-face competing for order flow in an 
open outcry environment. By bringing trading from the pit into the firm’s office, the traders lose valuable information 
obtained through personal contract.   
 
Benveniste, Marcus, and Wilhelm (1992) contend that transparency offered by the open outcry system is 
valuable in uncovering informed trades. Although they do not contend that traders on the NYSE are perfectly 
transparent, they argue that NYSE specialists are more likely to receive any information about the identity of traders 
than are NASDAQ dealers. Consequently, NYSE specialists are more likely to handle adverse selection better than 
NASDAQ market makers are. In other words, they believe that the differences between the specialist structure on 
NYSE and the multiple market maker system on NASDAQ cause higher adverse selection on NASDAQ. This 
situation would occur when insiders are less anonymous on the NYSE than on the NASDAQ. 
 
Yet, an opposing argument is that NASDAQ dealers can also deal with this adverse selection problem, but 
perhaps not as effectively as NYSE specialists can.  The underlying logic of this argument goes as follows. NASDAQ 
dealers interact directly with brokers and can negotiate prices over the telephone with them. Exchange specialists 
communicate with broker’s agents on the floor, but not directly with brokers. NASDAQ dealers maintain close 
contact with firms for which they make markets, but specialists do not have a similar relationship with listed firms. 
Through these relationships, NASDAQ dealers may be able to detect informed trading from insiders. Despite this 
potential type of information advantage over NYSE specialists, NASDAQ dealers face a substantial information 
disadvantage because of the fragmentation of order flow and anonymous electronic trading of NASDAQ. Thus, 
determining whether NASDAQ dealers can detect informed trading and adjust their market behavior accordingly is an 
empirical question. 
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DATA, VARIABLES, AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 In this section, we review the sample, the measurement of the variables used in the study, and research 
methodology. 
 
Data 
 
 We examine the NASDAQ-100 firms from July 1998 to September 1998. We obtain intra-day trades and 
quotes from the NYSE’s TAQ database. Our sample consists of 485 sell transactions. Unlike Garfinkel and 
Nimalendran (2002), we study all types of insider trading for all trade sizes.  We do not limit our examination to 
stealth (medium-sized) trades. Insider trading is a very small fraction of the overall volume for a day. 
 
 
Table 1:  Distribution of Insider Trading by Firm Size 
 
This table reports the summary statistics of 485 sell transactions on NASDAQ-100 stocks traded from July through September 
1998. The information is classified into four quartiles based on market value of equity from smallest (Q1) to largest (Q4). 
 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 All Firms 
Number of Firms 
Number of Insider transactions 
Average number of insider transactions per firm 
Average number of total transactions 
Percentage of insider trading  
Total value of insider transactions (in millions $) 
Median transaction size of insider trading 
25 
50 
2.00 
45,582 
0.004% 
$33.13 
$2,366,452 
25 
46 
1.84 
48,013 
0.004% 
$9.80 
$753,947 
25 
124 
4.96 
84,783 
0.006% 
$16.65 
$1,387,408 
25 
265 
10.60 
453,398 
0.002% 
$70.06 
$5,389,686 
100 
485 
4.85 
154,959 
0.003% 
$129.65 
$2,493,201 
 
 
Table 1 shows the summary statistics for our sample. We partition this table into quartiles (denoted by Q) by 
firm size as measured by the market value of equity. Table 1 shows that the average number of insider transactions 
increases by firm size from 2.00 transactions for the smallest group to 10.60 transactions for the largest group. The 
median transaction size of insider trading ranges from $753,947 to $5,389,585 for firms in Q2 and Q4, respectively. 
The size of these transactions is substantially larger than those observed by Chung and Charoenwong (1998) for 
NYSE listed stocks. The largest firms (Q4) account for more than half of the total insider transactions in term of 
number and value. Because the size and frequency of insider trading are larger in big firms, this may affect the 
information value of insider trades across different firm sizes.   
 
Measurement Of Variables 
 
 Table 2 provides a summary of the variables used in the study. We measure insider trading in two ways, 
which are consistent with Chung and Charoenwong (1998).  INS1 is the number of insider transactions. INS2 is the 
ratio of the number of insider transactions to the total number of transactions for the day. 
 
The spread computation for stock i on day t (SPREAD i,t) follows the approach used by McInish and Wood 
(1992):
6  
  
SPREADi,t = k (Dk/L) [(Askk - Bidk)/{( Askk + Bidk)/2}]                                                        (1) 
 
 
Dk  = the duration of quotation k in seconds 
L  = the number of seconds for the trading day 
Askk and Bidk = ask and bid prices, respectively, of quotation k, and k denotes the summation over k = 1 to θ, 
where θ is the number of quotations for the day.  
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Evidence by Benston and Hagerman (1974) and Stoll (1978) shows that riskier stocks are usually associated 
with larger spreads.  We use the variance of intraday returns as a proxy for the risk (RISK) related to the stock.  
 
We use average daily trade size (VOL) and number of transactions (NTS) as measures of trading activity. 
Studies by Benston and Hagerman (1974) as well as McInish and Wood (1992) document an inverse relationship 
between various measures of trading volume and spreads.  
 
Following the definition used by McInish and Wood (1992) as well as Chung and Charoenwong (1998), we 
use abnormal trade size (ABTSIZE) to study the influence of information on spreads. The abnormal trade size is 
defined as the difference between the average daily trade size and average annual trade size of the stock. We include 
share price (PRICE) to control the effect of low-priced shares. Low-priced stocks tend to have relatively larger spread 
compared to high-priced stocks.   
 
We measure firm size (MV) using the market value of the equity. We expect that smaller firms’ stocks may 
exhibit greater spreads due to their low liquidity.  Because firm size (MV) is correlated to variables such as PRICE 
and VOL, we introduce size into the cross-sectional regression model to segregate the correlation of firm size with 
spread from other variables.  
 
 Depth (DEPTH), another measure of market liquidity, represents size behind the reported quote for the bid 
and ask.  Depth refers to the number of shares of a security that can be sold at the bid and ask prices near the market 
without causing a dramatic change in the price. Because greater depth suggests more liquidity, depth may reduce the 
spread.  Chung and Charoenwong (1998) do not consider the impact of depth on spreads. 
 
Methodology 
  
We use both cross-sectional and pooled time series regressions to examine the impact of insider trading on 
market liquidity. We perform cross-sectional regression because the effect of certain variables on spread can be 
examined only in terms of their inter-stock differences.  Regression using cross-sectional data should reveal whether 
dealers establish different spreads for different levels of insider trading. We use pooled time series regression to 
determine whether dealers make changes to quoted spread and depth when insiders trade. Our OLS results are based 
on White’s (1980) correction for heteroscedasticity.7 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
In this section, we present the results of our cross-sectional and pooled time-series regression.  To assess the 
impact of insider trading on market maker behavior, we examine the insider-trading day (t0) and five days 
immediately before and after the insider-trading day. Thus, we analyze an 11-day event period.  To avoid potentially 
confounding results, our final sample contains no insider trading for any firm during the 11-day event period window 
except on the event day (t0). Table 3 presents information on spread, volume, and depth around the insider-trading 
day. The spread is lower on the insider-trading day than on surrounding days, possibly because other news raises 
spreads on the surrounding days.
8
 We observe that trading volume on the insider-trading day and two days before the 
insider-trading day is higher than trading volume after the insider-trading day. The depth of stocks on NASDAQ on 
and one day before the insider-trading day is higher than the other days in the event period. The abnormal trade size is 
also higher on and up to two days before the insider trade. This latter observation supports the view of Chung and 
Charoenwong (1998) that insiders may attempt to hide their trades by trading on high volume days. 
 
The smaller spreads could be driven by differences in risk, volume, or other variables for which we have not 
adequately accounted. Theoretically, dealers should maintain wider spreads for stocks when they have information on 
insider trading. If this situation exists, we would expect spread to be positively related to insider trading in a cross-
section of stocks. To evaluate whether dealers maintain a higher spread, we use the following cross-sectional 
regression model. 
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Table 2:  Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics of various firm characteristics and market microstructure variables for the stocks with 
insider trading on the day of that trade. SPREAD is the average spread of each stock for the period.  INS1 is the number of 
insider transactions for each stock. INS2 is the ratio of the number of insider transactions to the total number of transactions. 
RISK is the variance of daily returns for each stock.  NTS is the total number of transactions (trades). VOL is the average daily 
trade size for each stock. Price is the average price of each stock. MV is the market value of equity. 
 
   Percentile 
 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
25 50 75 100 
SPREAD 
INS1 
INS2 
RISK 
NTS 
VOL 
PRICE 
MV ($ million) 
0.1100 
1.4917 
0.0003 
1.87 x 10-6 
3286 
1004.81 
36.02 
2007 
0.0300 
0.6568 
0.0001 
2.78 x 10-6 
3276.53 
258.27 
4.2323 
6705 
0.0888 
1 
0.0002 
7.82 x 10-7 
885 
834.60 
33.55 
2433 
0.0989 
1.2778 
0.0003 
1.12 x 10-6 
2490 
954.46 
36.71 
4099 
0.1339 
1.778 
0.0004 
1.82 x 10-6 
3946 
1074.16 
39.46 
9388 
0.2115 
4.1667 
0.0004 
2.4 x 10-5 
19631 
2312.70 
42.90 
5548 
 
 
Table 3:  Effects around the Insider-Trading Day 
 
This table reports the average daily spread, volume, abnormal trade size, and depth during 11-day window including the insider-
trading day (t0) for NASDAQ-100 stocks (485 sell transactions) traded from July through September 1998. 
 
Day1 Spread2 % Spread3 
Total 
Trading 
Volume4 
Insider 
Trading 
Volume5 
Non-insider 
trading 
volume6 
Abnormal 
Trade size7 
Depth8 
-5 
-4 
-3 
-2 
-1 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
0.1322 
0.1317 
0.1340 
0.1313 
0.1286 
0.1305 
0.1334 
0.1355 
0.1374 
0.1386 
0.1377 
0.0030 
0.0029 
0.0030 
0.0029 
0.0029 
0.0029 
0.0030 
0.0031 
0.0032 
0.0032 
0.0031 
1149.53 
1145.02 
1111.43 
1176.13 
1183.49 
1152.34 
1134.16 
1118.62 
1111.04 
1124.03 
1114.52 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
18.39 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1149.53 
1145.02 
1111.43 
1176.13 
1183.49 
1134.95 
1134.16 
1118.62 
1111.04 
1124.03 
1114.52 
20.5220 
16.2561 
-16.6630 
47.5541 
54.9153 
24.4845 
6.4464 
-10.2462 
-16.9501 
-3.6746 
-11.4040 
3058.68 
3049.86 
3025.30 
3056.33 
3078.39 
3050.40 
2953.57 
2929.01 
2901.59 
2994.48 
2979.79 
 
1 Trading day relative to insider trading day 
2 The average daily spread 
3 The average daily spread in percentage 
4 The average daily trading volume (trade size) 
5 The average daily volume of insiders 
6 The average daily trading volume of non-insiders 
7 The average daily abnormal trade size 
8 The average daily depth (ask plus bid depth) 
 
 
SPREAD i = 0 + 1INS1 i (INS2 i )+ 2RISK i + 3VOLi + 4PRICE i + 5 MV i + i                         (2) 
 
To compare our results using cross-sectional regression to those of Chung and Charoenwong (1998), we 
exclude the variable ABTSIZE and DEPTH. 
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Table 4:  Cross-Sectional Regression Analysis 
 
SPREAD i, = 0 + 1INS1i(INS2 i) + 2RISK i + 3VOLi + 4PRICE i + 5 MV i + t 
 
This table presents the results of the cross-sectional regression analysis. INS1 is the number of insider transactions for each 
stock. INS2 is the ratio of insider transactions to the total number of transactions for each stock. RISK is the variance of returns 
for each stock. VOL is the trading volume for each stock. PRICE is the average share price.   MV is the market value of equity. 
 
Panel A:  Using INS1 As An Insider-Trading Measure 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept 
 
INS1 
 
RISK 
 
VOL 
 
PRICE 
 
MV 
 
Adj R2 
F-stat 
0.1826 
(18.44)* 
-0.0006 
(-0.60) 
591.1387 
(2.88)* 
-1.30 x 10-10 
(-7.32) 
 
 
 
 
0.2458 
11.648 
0.0978 
(8.19)* 
-0.0011 
(-1.56) 
584.5620 
(3.86)* 
-2.40 x 10-10 
(-8.96)* 
0.0023 
(8.23*) 
 
 
0.5890 
36.115 
0.0970 
(7.51)* 
-0.0011 
(-1.52) 
586.8578 
(3.84)* 
-2.36 x 10-10 
(-6.40)* 
0.0026 
(8.66)* 
-2.12 x 10-14 
(-1.81) 
0.5847 
28.599 
Panel B:  Using INS2 As An Insider-Trading Measure 
Intercept 
 
INS2 
 
RISK 
 
VOL 
 
PRICE 
 
MV 
 
Adj R2 
F-stat 
0.1773 
(16.24)* 
50.1912 
(0.69) 
620.9112 
(3.01)* 
-1.36 x 10-10 
(-4.25)* 
 
 
 
 
0.2468 
11.701 
0.0961 
(7.75)* 
-1.2529 
(-0.02) 
602.8027 
(3.90)* 
-2.5588 x 10-10 
(-9.28)* 
0.0025 
(8.70)* 
 
 
0.5784 
34.618 
0.0944 
(7.08)* 
-0.6456 
(-0.02) 
607.2369 
(3.90)* 
-2.4741 x 10-10 
(-6.66)* 
0.0025 
(8.45)* 
-4.3163 x 10-14 
(-1.92) 
0.5744 
27.457 
*Significance at the 5% level 
 
 
Panel A of Table 4 reports the results of a cross-sectional regression analysis using INS1 (the number of 
insider transactions) as the measure of insider trading. The first regression model shows the results when including 
only insider trading, risk, and volume. Models 2 and 3 show the results by adding share price and market value. 
Insider trading as measured by INS1 is not statistically significant under all three models.   The results show that 
insider trading does not affect the spreads in NASDAQ. By contrast, Chung and Charoenwong (1998) report a 
significant cross-sectional association between spread and insider trading for NYSE and AMEX listed stocks.  
 
Because the estimated coefficients for INS1 for all three models are similar in magnitude, multicollinearity is 
unlikely to affect the results in any significant manner. However, other events contemporaneous with insider trades 
may help to explain the lack of significant relationship between insider trading and spread behavior. 
 
The estimated coefficients of other variables (RISK, VOL, PRICE) are statistically significant. These results 
are consistent with those presented in previous studies. The volume variable is significant in all three models. Adding 
market value in Model 3 does not increase the value of adjusted R
2
. Overall, Models 2 and 3 explain about 58% of the 
cross-sectional variation in spreads. 
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Table 5:  Pooled Time-Series Regression 
 
SPREAD t, =0 + 1INS1t(INS2t)+ 2RISKt + 3VOL t + 4PRICE t+ 5 ABTSIZEt + 6DEPTH t + t 
This table presents the results of the pooled time-series regression analysis. INS1 is the number of net insider transactions for 
each stock. INS2 is the ratio of insider transactions to the total number of transactions for each stock. RISK is the variance of 
returns for each stock.  VOL is the trading volume for each stock. PRICE is the average share price. ABTSIZE is the abnormal 
volume for each stock.  DEPTH is to the number of shares of a security that can be sold at the bid and ask prices near the market 
without causing a dramatic change in the price. 
 
Panel A 
 Model 1 t-stats Model 2 t-stats 
Intercept 
INS1(1) 
RISK 
VOL 
PRICE 
ABTSIZE 
Adj R2 
F-Value 
0.1216 
0.0126 
15.0199 
-1.16 x 10-8 
0.0018 
-1.60 x 10-5 
0.3233 
606.185 
62.16* 
5.84* 
4.59* 
-46.51* 
40.96* 
-7.11* 
0.1218 
5.4342 
15.0819 
-1.17 x 10-8 
0.0018 
-1.61 x 10-5 
0.3204 
598.199 
62.08* 
2.63* 
4.60* 
-47.12* 
40.66* 
-7.14* 
Panel B 
 Model 1 t-stats Model 2 t-stats 
Intercept 
INS1(2) 
RISK 
VOL 
PRICE 
ABTSIZE 
Depth 
Adj R2 
F-Value 
0.1917 
0.0118 
14.7818 
-6.3934 x 10-9 
0.0014 
1.2894 x 10-5 
-2.321 x 10-5 
0.3750 
634.523 
53.38* 
5.66* 
4.70* 
19.40* 
28.99* 
5.94* 
22.92* 
0.1923 
5.6972 
14.8306 
-6.5098 x 10-9 
0.0014 
-1.2972 x 10-5 
2.3330 x 10-5 
0.3727 
628.222 
53.42* 
2.87* 
4.71* 
19.73* 
28.72* 
5.96* 
22.99* 
* Significance at the 5% level 
 
 
Previous studies show that the market may respond to insider trading when it is significant in relation to total 
trading. To consider the effect of insider trading on spreads, Panel B of Table 4 uses INS2, which is the ratio of net 
insider transactions to total transactions. The results in Panel B are consistent with those reported in Panel A, 
confirming that insider trading does not have a significant impact on spread quoted by dealers in our sample of 
NASDAQ stocks. All other control variables are significant and the regression model explains up to 57% of the cross-
sectional variation in spreads. From the cross-sectional regression results, we do not find any significant relationship 
between the proportions of insider trading and spread. These results suggest that the information disadvantage due to 
anonymous trading and fragmentation of order flow across different NASDAQ dealers at a given point in time 
outweighs any information advantage NASDAQ dealers may have due to their ability to maintain close contacts with 
brokers and firms. Based on this evidence, NASDAQ dealers appear unable to detect and respond to informed order 
flow.
9 
 
Table 5 presents the pooled time-series regression results of the number of net insider transactions on the 
quoted spread.  We use the following model for the contemporaneous period:  
 
SPREAD t, = 0 + 1INS1t(INS2t)+ 2RISKt + 3VOL t + 4PRICE t+  5 ABTSIZE t +6DEPTH t + t                                    (3) 
 
Panel A of Table 5 shows the results for Model 1, which are based on the number of insider transactions 
(INS1) as the measure of insider trading.  Panel A also shows the results for Model 2, which uses INS2 (ratio of net 
insider transactions to total transactions) as the measure of insider trading. The coefficients for both measures are 
positive and in the predicted direction. After controlling for the effect of other variables (RISK, VOL, ABTSIZE, 
PRICE), the association between insider trading and spread is statistically significant. The regression models in Panel 
A do not control for depth. 
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In addition to the control variables used in Panel A, the models used in Panel B also control for depth. The 
results suggest that INS1 and INS2 have a significant impact on the spread. Again, the coefficients are positive and in 
the predicted direction. All other variables are significant in both the models. The significance of abnormal trade size 
suggests that NASDAQ dealers react to large transactions and adjust spreads. DEPTH helps to explain the spread in 
the stocks. These results suggest that the measures of insider trading (INS1 and INS2) and DEPTH are important in 
explaining the variation in spread. 
 
Taken in isolation, these results suggest that over time NASDAQ dealers may be able to unravel at least 
some of the informed order flow and adjust spreads accordingly. Thus, NASDAQ dealers may attempt to recover over 
time what they apparently lose at a given point in time to the informed order flow. A possible implication of these 
results is that dealers require time for any informational advantage associated with maintaining a close contact with 
brokers and firms to counteract their informational disadvantage of operating in a fragmented and relatively 
anonymous trading environment.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 Based on our evidence, we can draw several tentative conclusions about the impact of insider trading on 
market liquidity in NASDAQ.  On one hand, we find that spreads are lower on the insider-trading day than on 
surrounding days. This evidence conflicts with the hypothesis that NASDAQ dealers alter their behavior on insider 
trades by widening quoted spreads. We also find no evidence of a cross-sectional association between spreads and 
insider trading.  An implication of these combined findings is that NASDAQ dealers are unaware of the presence of 
insiders and may lose money to them that is unrecoverable.  
 
On the other hand, we document statistically significant pooled time-series effects of insider trading on 
spreads. The time-series results provide a way of viewing how dealers respond to insider trading that considers a time 
dimension. An implication of this finding is that dealers make intertemporal adjustments to the spreads when insiders 
trade.  
 
By contrast, Chung and Charoenwong (1998) find evidence of cross-sectional association between spreads 
and insider trading but no time series association between these variables in the NYSE and AMEX specialist market. 
Such differences in results from our study may stem from differences in market microstructure arrangements such as 
the degree of anonymity reported by Benveniste, Marcus, and Wilhelm (1992) and documented by Garfinkel and 
Nimalendran (2003). 
 
Taken as a whole, our results provide mixed evidence on the ability of NASDAQ dealers to unravel informed 
order flow and adjust spreads accordingly. Their short-term behavior suggests an inability to detect insider trading and 
widen spreads, but their behavior over time suggests that dealers attempt to recover what they apparently lose at a 
given point and time. 
 
SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
Researchers could modify or extend research on the relationship between insider trading and market liquidity 
in several ways. First, they could increase the size and duration of the sample. Our sample consists of 485 sell 
transactions over a limited period. Second, researchers could use effective spreads, instead of daily quoted spreads, to 
measure the reaction to insider trading. Third, they could use alternative approaches such as concentrating on the price 
impact of medium size sell orders on insider trading days and comparing them to an average day.  Finally, researchers 
could compare specialist and dealer reactions to insider trading using the methodology in our paper as opposed to that 
used by Garfinkel and Nimalendran (2003).  Control variables could be used, similar to those specified by Chung and 
Charoenwong (1998), to control for major differences in the firms on the different markets. 
 
________________________________________ 
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ENDNOTES 
 
1. See, for example, O’Hara (1995) for a discussion of market microstructure theory involving information-
based models.  
2. For example, information-based models by Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Easley and O’Hara (1987) 
assume trader identity is unknown, whereas models by Admati and Pfleider (1991) and Forster and George 
(1992) allow for some trader transparency. 
3. For effects of legal insider trading surrounding various events, see Netter and Mitchell (1989), Eyssell 
(1991), Karpoff and Lee (1991), Liu, Smith, and Syed (1992), Eyssell and Arshadi (1993), Eyssell and 
Reburn (1993), Chowdhury, Howe, and Lin (1993), Bebchuk and Fershtman (1994), Sivakumar and 
Waymire (1994), Ferreira (1995), Hanson and Song (1995), Pettitt and Vankatesh (1995), Raad and Wu 
(1995), Johnson, Serrano, and Tompson (1996), and Khan and Lamba (2001).  For effects of illegal insider 
trading activity, see Chakravarty and McConnell (1997). 
4. In practice, insiders may have various motives for trading, such as for liquidity reasons. Thus, information 
that dealers elicit through their relationships with brokers and firms may only provide a noisy signal of the 
insider’s motive. 
5. Unlike the cross-sectional regression analysis conducted by Chung and Charoenwong (1998), we exclude 
two independent variables: (1) a dummy variable representing the NYSE listing and (2) a variable 
representing the number of exchanges on which a stock is listed.  Both variables have little, if any, meaning 
for our study involving NASDAQ. 
6. Quoted spreads do not take into account market maker efforts to “price improve” on orders, which could 
affect measures of liquidity. Garfinkel and Nimalendran (2002) favor effective spreads but form similar 
conclusions about relative anonymity on the NYSE and NASDAQ whether they investigate changes in 
quoted spreads or effective spreads. That is, they find evidence that is consistent with less anonymity on the 
NYSE specialist system compared to the NASDAQ dealer system. 
7. For a detailed discussion of tests and corrections for heteroskedasticity (including White’s test and 
correction), see White (1980) and Greene (1993). 
8. T-tests for differences in means show that the spread on the event day (t0) differs significantly at the 5% level 
from the spread for each of the surrounding days.  These results are available from the authors upon request. 
9. The possibility exists that dealers can detect insider trades to sell, and lower both bid and ask prices in 
response. This will leave the spread unaffected. 
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